The Right to Appeal in Comparative Perspective by Djukić, Dražan
The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 
Volume 19 Issue 2 Article 4 
2018 
The Right to Appeal in Comparative Perspective 
Dražan Djukić 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess 
 Part of the Civil Law Commons, Common Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, 
Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dražan Djukić, The Right to Appeal in Comparative Perspective, 19 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 187 (2018). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess/vol19/iss2/4 
This document is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process by an authorized administrator of 





      05/06/2019   10:22:20
41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 19 Side A      05/06/2019   10:22:20
DJUKICRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)  4/30/2019 7:53 PM 
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS  Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 2018) 
THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Dražan Djuki *
ABSTRACT
Appellate procedures regarding the most serious crimes 
under domestic law are, in general, conducted differently in 
common law and civil law systems. This article reviews the 
differences concerning the primary facets of such 
proceedings, namely prosecutorial rights of appeal, access 
to appellate review, the scope of appellate review, the 
admission of additional evidence, appellate decisionmaking 
powers, and the functions of appellate review. It then 
explains that these differences result from dissimilar 
decisionmaking processes, degrees of adherence to the 
search for the truth, and sources of law. 
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been noted that, in contrast to the extensive appellate 
procedures of civil law jurisdictions, essential characteristics of 
the common law variation of criminal procedure can include 
elements “such as . . . possibly even the absence of appellate 
procedure.”1 Indeed, the early criminal procedural systems of 
*Associate Legal Officer (Chambers), International Criminal Court. This article is an 
adjusted and updated version of a part of the author’s Ph.D. thesis, which was defended in 
December 2017 at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. Any views expressed are those of 
the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Criminal 
Court. 
1. Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 556 (1973). However, systems 
of criminal procedure are not in practice neatly divided according to the common law/civil 
law divide. E.g., id. at 577 (observing that “all criminal processes appear mixed” because 
of “heavy borrowings from the other camp”); Esin Örücü, Family Trees for Legal Systems: 
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neither England and Wales nor South Africa offered the 
possibility to appeal criminal judgments.2 Similarly, the right to 
appeal was not included in the U.S. Constitution.3 In 1894, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that “[i]t is wholly within the 
discretion of the state to allow or not allow . . . review” of a 
criminal judgment.4
However, the evolution of modern common law 
jurisdictions has led to the introduction of significant rights of 
appeal. For instance, the Court of Criminal Appeal, the 
predecessor of the current Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
in England and Wales, was established in response to notorious 
miscarriages of justice in 1907.5 Starting from 1879, appellate 
rights were extended in South Africa, but it was not until 1948 
that the Appellate Division, the precursor to the current Supreme 
Court of Appeal, began hearing appeals.6 In addition, the federal 
courts in the U.S. and those of most U.S. states now vest 
defendants with relatively broad appellate rights.7
COMPARATIVE LAW 359, 363 (Mark van Hoecke et al. eds., 2004) (noting that legal 
systems are “mixed and overlapping”); J.R. Spencer, Introduction, in EUROPEAN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 1, 37–65 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., 2002) 
(discussing outside pressures on heuristic models). Even so, these distinctions retain value, 
because they enable “the grand contours of real-life contrast” to be described. Damaška, 
supra this note, at 577 n.190. 
2. ROSEMARY PATTENDEN, ENGLISH CRIMINAL APPEALS, 1844–1994: APPEALS 
AGAINST CONVICTION AND SENTENCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 5–33 (1996) (surveying 
history); CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HANDBOOK 395 (J.J. Joubert ed., 11th ed. 2014) 
[hereinafter JOUBERT HANDBOOK] (noting that “[a]ccording to Roman-Dutch law, the 
general rule was that neither the prosecution nor a convicted person could appeal in 
criminal cases”). 
3. RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1559 (2d ed. 
2005); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1294 (5th ed. 2009). For a 
critical perspective, see David Rossman, Were There No Appeal: The History of Review in 
American Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518 (1990), and Marc M. 
Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503 
(1992). 
4. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1294 (citing McCane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 
(1894)). 
5. PATTENDEN, supra note 2, at 27–33 (discussing the Beck and Edalji cases and the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1907). 
6. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION, THE RIGHT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC 
PROSECUTIONS TO APPEAL ON QUESTIONS OF FACT §§ 2.8–2.11 (Dec. 2000) [hereinafter 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION].
7. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(j)(1)(A)–(B) (2014) (requiring trial court to advise 
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Rights of appeal have, therefore, become an indispensable 
feature of nearly all systems of criminal procedure. Modern 
jurisdictions almost invariably provide for at least one stage of 
appellate review of a criminal conviction. Even so, the appellate 
machineries of common law and civil law jurisdictions, the 
major legal families of the world,8 diverge significantly. The 
various approaches to appellate review have been described as 
one of “the major differences” between existing common law 
and civil law systems.9 However, criminal appeals generally 
tend to receive limited attention in scholarship.10
Accordingly, this article seeks to place the right to appeal a 
criminal conviction in comparative perspective by contrasting 
civil law and common law approaches to appellate review. So as 
to allow for a meaningful comparison, Section II will put the 
primary aspects of appellate review at second instance in 
relation to the most serious crimes recognised in a domestic 
legal order side by side,11 on the basis of a sufficiently wide and 
geographically diverse sample of common law jurisdictions12
note 3, at 1284, 1294 (noting, respectively, that not all U.S. jurisdictions “allow appellate 
review of sentences” and that it can be “provided under state law”).
8. JEAN PRADEL, DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ 631 (3d ed. 2008) (summarizing the origins 
of the two legal systems). The civil law family is also referred to as “Continental, Romano-
Germanic, or Roman Law because its origins are in the old Roman Code of Justinian and 
the laws of the Germanic tribes.” HARRY R. DAMMER & ERIKA FAIRCHILD, COMPARATIVE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 51 (2006). The common law family is also referred to as the 
“Anglo-American” model. E.g., Alphons Orie, Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in 
International Criminal Proceedings prior to the Establishment of the ICC and in the 
Proceedings before the ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: A COMMENTARY 1439, 1440 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones 
eds., 2002). However, for the sake of consistency, the terms “civil law” and “common law” 
will be employed throughout this article. 
9. Spencer, supra note 1, at 27, 28–30.
10. Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 1–2 (2011). 
11. It is noteworthy that the appellate processes pertaining to different categories of 
crimes may differ in domestic jurisdictions. See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH & MIKE 
REDMAYNE, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 371–72, 377–78 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing in 
general terms the appellate practice in England and Wales, and practice at the Court of 
Appeals); STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], §§ 312 
(providing for appeal), 349(5) (setting out procedures for dismissal without hearing), 
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html (Ger.).
12. England and Wales, the U.S., and South Africa. The former two jurisdictions are 
archetypical representatives of the common law family. However, the classification of 
South Africa as a common law jurisdiction is not as obvious. Its legal system has been 
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and civil law jurisdictions13 Subsequently, Section III will 
identify the underlying reasons for such divergences. 
II. APPELLATE PROCEDURES IN CIVIL LAW
AND COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS
This section will consider the following aspects of common 
law and civil law appellate processes: prosecutorial rights of 
appeal; access to appellate review; the scope of appellate 
review; the admission of additional evidence on appeal; 
decisionmaking powers of appellate courts; and the functions of 
appellate review. 
A. Prosecutorial Rights of Appeal 
1. In Common Law Jurisdictions, the Double Jeopardy Doctrine 
Limits Prosecutorial Rights of Appeal. 
In England and Wales, the double jeopardy rule prevents 
prosecutorial appeals against acquittals pronounced by a jury.14
Dutch civil law and English common law.” Jacques E. du Plessis, South Africa, in ELGAR 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 667, 667 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006). Nevertheless, 
in respect of criminal procedure, South Africa’s common law tradition overshadows the 
civil law influence. Following the introduction of a civil-law-inspired system of criminal 
procedure by Dutch colonisers in the seventeenth century, a set of legal reforms led to “the 
anglicisation of the law of criminal procedure and evidence . . . , putting an end to the 
inquisitorial system and replacing it with the accusatorial English procedure” at the end of 
the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. JOUBERT HANDBOOK, supra
note 2, at 24. 
13. France, Germany, and Argentina. The former two jurisdictions constitute the 
backbone of the civil law family. DAMMER & FAIRCHILD, supra note 8, at 54 (describing 
the French and German Civil Codes as “enormously influential”), 77–84 (discussing 
French and German systems in some detail). In line with the general orientation of Latin 
American countries towards the civil law tradition, Argentina has, in general, also been 
included in this category. Alejandro D. Carrió & Alejandro M. Garro, Argentina, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—A WORLDWIDE STUDY 3, 3 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007) 
(acknowledging that Argentina’s criminal procedures “retain[] the basic features of 
criminal procedure shared by most Continental legal systems influenced by French law”). 
However, significant common-law-inspired amendments to the Argentine Code of 
Criminal Procedure have been introduced. See Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand, Argentina: 
Reform of Code of Criminal Procedure, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS—GLOBAL LEGAL 
MONITOR (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/argentina-reform- 
of-code-of-criminal-procedure/. Even so, Argentina has been classified as a civil law 
jurisdiction for the purposes of this article because, as discussed below, its appellate 
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However, the prosecution’s appellate rights have been 
noticeably expanded over the years. Three relatively limited 
legal reforms were enacted from 1972 to 1996. First, the 
attorney general was given the power to seek the opinion of the 
appellate court on a point of law in relation to an acquittal.15
Such a referral may generate limited effects, however, because it 
cannot “affect the trial in relation to which the reference is made 
or any acquittal in that trial.”16 Second, in respect of sentencing 
that appears unduly lenient, the attorney general was endowed 
with the right to refer such a case to the appellate court.17 Unlike 
the first change, this second enactment empowered the appellate 
court to “quash any sentence passed” and “pass such sentence as 
they think appropriate for the case and as the court below had 
power to pass.”18 Finally, the possibility has been created for the 
prosecution to apply for a retrial for “tainted” acquittals. This 
concerns the situation “[w]here a person has been convicted of 
an administration of justice offence involving interference with 
or intimidation of a juror or a witness (or potential witness) in 
any proceedings which led to the acquittal.”19 In 2001, reforms 
were taken further.20 Prosecutorial rights to challenge rulings 
during trials on indictment were introduced. In this regard,21
“the prosecution have the power to appeal practically any ruling 
in a trial on indictment in the Crown Court up to the point of the 
summing up,” even though it was originally envisaged that such 
appeals would only concern “terminatory rulings”—those that 
bring a trial to an end.22 Most notably, such powers encompass 
rulings as to “no case to answer,”23 which concern acquittals 
14. ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 11, at 397. 
15. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1972, c. 71, § 36(1) (Eng. & Wales).
16. Id. § 36(7). 
17. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988, c. 33, § 36(1) (Eng. & Wales).
18. Id. § 36(1) (a)–(b).
19. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND INVESTIGATIONS ACT 1996, c. 25, § 54(1)(b) (Eng. & 
Wales).
20. Law Commission, Double Jeopardy and Prosecution Appeals—Report on Two 
References under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com. No. 267) 
(2001). 
21. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003, c. 44, §§ 57, 58 (Eng. & Wales).
22. David Ormerod, Adrian Waterman & Rudi Fortson, Prosecution Appeals—Too 
Much of a Good Thing? 2010 CRIM. L. REV. 169, 169 (2010). 
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directed by a judge instead of the jury.24 Considering that these 
powers may, in effect, lead to an acquittal being overturned, it 
introduces a significant inroad into the double jeopardy 
principle. The most important constraints in this regard25
concern the need for leave to appeal and the agreement of the 
prosecution that the defendant will be acquitted should leave to 
appeal be denied or should the appeal be abandoned.26
Furthermore, in respect of certain serious offences,27 the 
prosecution was empowered to apply for the quashing of an 
acquittal and a re-trial upon the discovery of “new and 
compelling evidence.”28
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars U.S. prosecutors from 
appealing acquittals pronounced by juries.29 This interpretation 
proceeds from the proposition that a second trial upon a 
prosecutorial appeal places the defendant twice in jeopardy, 
because an acquittal terminates the initial jeopardy.30 Directed 
acquittals entered by judges have been equated to jury acquittals 
concerning double jeopardy protection, even when such 
acquittals go against relevant procedures.31 In addition, a remand 
to a lower court is precluded where an appellate court overturns 
24. Rosemary Pattenden, Prosecution Appeals against Judges’ Rulings, 2000 CRIM. L.
REV. 971, 976–77 (2000) (discussing policy behind prohibition on prosecution’s appeal of 
directed acquittal). 
25. See Ormerod et al., supra note 22, at 185–93 (enumerating further differences). 
26. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003, c. 44, §§ 57(4) (requiring leave to appeal), 58(8)–(9) 
(addressing automatic acquittal) (Eng. & Wales).
27. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003, Schedule 5, Pt. 1 (Eng. & Wales) (listing such 
“offenses against the person” as murder, rape, genocide, and hostage-taking).
28. Id. §§ 75 (describing cases that may be re-tried), 76 (addressing required application 
to court of appeal), 78(2)–(3) (defining “new” and “compelling”).
29. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1223–24 (tracing Court’s long recognition of 
double jeopardy standard back to United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896)). 
30. Id. at 1212 (discussing Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), in which the 
Court declined to adopt the Holmesean theory of “continuing jeopardy,” see id. at 134–35 
(Holmes, White & McKenna, JJ., dissenting)). The U.S. Supreme Court, thus, rejects the 
position that a retrial initiated by a prosecutorial appeal forms part of one and the same 
cause and, therefore, the same jeopardy. For a critical perspective, see Akil Reed Amar, 
Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1842–45 (1997). 
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a conviction based on the insufficiency of evidence,32 because it 
does not matter whether the reviewing court or the trial court 
deemed the evidence insufficient.33 Nonetheless, several 
exceptions have been carved out. Firstly, where a defendant 
moves for dismissal on grounds unrelated to the determination 
of factual guilt, but on the basis of, for example, procedural 
defects, no claim arises under the double jeopardy doctrine.34 In 
this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that double 
jeopardy protection only attaches to “acquittals,” which concern 
rulings that resolve some or all of the factual elements of the 
offences charged in favour of the defendant.35 Secondly, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has found that “a defendant has no 
legitimate claim to benefit from an error of law when that error 
could be corrected without subjecting him to a second trial.”36
Thirdly, a clear exception to the double jeopardy rule is reflected 
in statutory rights afforded to the prosecution to seek a higher 
sentence on appeal.37 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
essential protection of double jeopardy is to prevent a retrial on 
guilt, and a sentence appeal does not amount to a retrial.38
Finally, fraudulently obtained acquittals could possibly 
constitute another exception. In a case involving an acquittal 
pronounced by a bribed judge, an appellate court held that the 
person concerned was never in jeopardy and the U.S. Supreme 
Court refused discretionary review.39
The rights of appeal of South African prosecutors may be 
exercised in two ways. First, questions of law may be “reserved” 
upon request of the prosecutor for determination by the appellate 
court.40 This procedure is available 
32. This protection does not apply to situations where reversal of the conviction was 
secured on grounds other than the sufficiency of evidence, such as a trial error. Id. at 1226. 
Nevertheless, some types of misconduct by the prosecution may bar retrial. Id. at 1227. 
33. Id. at 1227 (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)). 
34. Id. at 1222–23. 
35. Id. (contrasting dismissal with acquittal). 
36. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345 (1975).  
37. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1284. 
38. Id. at 1284–85 (discussing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980)). 
39. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 1492–93 (discussing Aleman v. Judges of Cook 
Cnty. Cir. Ct., 138 F.3d 302, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 868 (1998)). 
40. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977 § 319(1) (S. Afr.). A court may also 
reserve a question of law on its own motion or upon request by the accused. Id. More 
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(1) where there has been an acquittal . . . , which is a 
finding whereby the accused is set completely free . . . ; 
(2) where a court quashes an indictment . . . ; 
(3) where there has been a conviction and the question of 
law may be to the advantage of the accused . . . ; [and] 
(4) where the question of law may have a bearing upon the 
validity of the sentence imposed . . .41
Second, a prosecutor may appeal “against a sentence imposed 
upon an accused in a criminal case.”42 A challenge to this 
provision on constitutional grounds has been rejected, on the 
basis that a sentence appeal does not amount to a trial de novo,
the procedure is not unfair, and the accused’s right to a fair trial 
must be interpreted in the context of the rights and interests of 
the law-abiding persons in society.43 It follows that a 
prosecutorial appeal from acquittal on questions of fact is 
disallowed, in conformity with the double jeopardy principle.44
However, the South African Law Commission has 
recommended that such a ban ought to be dispensed with.45 In 
the view of the Commission this right “should be limited to 
those cases where a miscarriage of justice occurred on the 
evidence before the court.”46 This proposal was mainly 
Act’s section 316(3)(a) (providing for appeal upon application by the appropriate 
prosecutor in connection with “a decision in favour of the accused on a question of law”), 
and section 333 (providing for submission to the Court of Appeal of cases in which “the 
Minister has any doubt as to the correctness of any decision” or of cases that conflict on 
questions of law with other decisions).
41. JOUBERT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 443 (citations omitted). 
42. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977, supra note 40, § 316B(1). For a critical 
perspective, see Jan H. van Rooyen, A Perspective on the Criminal Law Amendment Bill, 3 
S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUSTICE 162, 168 (1990). 
43. Louise Jordaan, Appeal by the Prosecution and the Right of the Accused to Be 
Protected against Double Jeopardy: A Comparative Perspective, 32 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S.
AFR. 1, 12 (1999). 
44. Id. at 8; see also S. AFR. CONST. art. 35(3)(m). 
45. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION, supra note 6, at §§ 1.1 (noting that 
Commission was directed to determine “whether the State should be given the right of 
appeal against sentence”), 5.31 (recommending that “provision be made for the Director of 
Public Prosecutions to appeal on questions of fact”).
46. Id. §§ 3.10 (suggesting that that “an appeal against acquittal would . . . in practice 
be undertaken only where there has been a clear miscarriage of justice and normally where 
the offence is a serious one”), 5.27 (concluding that “the right to appeal on questions of 
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grounded in the public interest of preventing judicial error, the 
absence of a prohibition on state appeals in international and 
regional agreements on human rights, the possibility of such 
appeals in some common law and civil law systems, and the 
consideration that such appeals do not contravene the double 
jeopardy clause since appellate proceedings are an extension of 
the original proceedings.47 Nevertheless, hitherto, no such 
reforms have been implemented.48
2. In Civil Law Systems, the Appellate Rights of the Prosecution 
Are Generally on Par with Those of the Accused. 
The current code of criminal procedure in France expressly 
recognises the right to appeal of both the accused and the 
prosecution.49 However, amendments adopted in 2000 allowed 
prosecutorial appeals from convictions only and, thus, expressed 
the principle that an acquittal is final.50 This restriction has been 
described as illogical in the literature, because, in respect of less 
serious offences, a prosecutorial appeal against an acquittal was 
permitted by law.51 Accordingly, a 2002 amendment extended 
the appellate powers of prosecutorial authorities to appeals from 
acquittals.52 Such a right to appeal has been characterised as 
indispensable in practice, since it ensures, inter alia, a full re-
evidence before the court,” pointing out that “[t]he intention is not to give the state a 
second bite of the cherry” because “[t]he state cannot rectify its own errors on appeal”).
47. Id. at 5.2–5.4 (addressing the purpose of the right to appeal, international 
agreements, and world-wide practices relating to appeal by the state in criminal cases), 
5.11–5.21 (distinguishing appeal from double jeopardy and discussing positions taken by 
various commentators). For a critical perspective, see Mervyn Bennun, Prosecution 
Appeals against Acquittals: The Law Commission’s Proposals, 15 S. AFR. J. CRIM.
JUSTICE 88 (2002). 
48. JOUBERT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 411 (referring to statutorily provided 
prosecution appeal “for the reservation of a question of law for the consideration of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal”), 443 (noting that “[o]nly the accused person may appeal on the 
merits of a case”); SHANNON VAUGHN HOCTOR, CRIMINAL LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 239–
41 (2013) (explaining that although a convicted person may file an appeal against 
conviction if leave to appeal is granted, the prosecution may appeal only on a point of law). 
49. CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNAL [C. PR. PÉN.] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 
380-2 (Fr.).
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examination of a case in which only certain accused appeal in a 
multi-accused trial.53
In Germany, the prosecution’s right “to file the appellate 
remedies admissible against court decisions” mirrors the right of 
appeal extended to the accused.54 However, certain facets of the 
prosecution’s right of appeal operate, or have been restricted, in 
favour of the accused. In addition to appeals lodged to the 
detriment of the accused,55 the prosecution is separately 
empowered to file an appeal “for the benefit of the accused.”56
In any event, a prosecutorial appeal “shall have the effect that 
the contested decision may be amended or revoked, also for the 
accused’s benefit.”57 Thus, the appellate court is required to 
assess the matter comprehensively.58 Finally, “[t]he violation of 
legal norms existing solely for the defendant’s benefit may not 
be invoked by the public prosecution office for the purpose of 
quashing the judgment to the defendant’s detriment.”59
The Argentine Supreme Court has found that the extension 
of appellate rights of the prosecution is not contrary to either due 
process or double jeopardy.60 More specifically, the prosecution 
may appeal from an acquittal61 and from a conviction where the 
imposed sentence was less than half the requested sentence.62
However, on the basis of an appeal lodged by the prosecution, 
the appellate court may also modify or revoke the judgment to 
53. Id.
54. STPO, supra note 11, § 296, para. 1.
55. JÜRGEN PETER GRAF ET AL., STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG, MIT 
GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN: KOMMENTAR 1236–37, 1242 
(2010).
56. STPO, supra note 11, § 296, para. 2.
57. Id. § 301.
58. GRAF ET AL., supra note 55, at 1242. However, this obligation is limited by the 
scope of the prosecutorial appeal. For instance, a prosecutorial appeal confined to the 
sentence cannot lead to alterations in respect of the criminal responsibility of the accused. 
Id.
59. STPO, supra note 11, § 339. For instance, where an accused is acquitted 
notwithstanding a failure to assign counsel, the prosecution may not appeal on the basis of 
a violation of the right to counsel and seek a conviction to be imposed. GRAF ET AL., supra
note 55, at 1483. 
60. Carrió & Garro, supra note 13.
61. CÓDIGO PROCESAL PENAL DE LA NACION [CÓD. PROC. PEN.] [CODE OF CRIMINAL 
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the benefit of the accused.63 In addition, the prosecution is 
separately empowered to appeal in favour of the accused.64
B. Access to Appellate Review 
1. Common Law Systems Use Impediments to Dissuade Parties 
from Entering the Appellate Process. 
The appellate system of England and Wales discourages the 
exercise of appellate rights in different ways. The three 
following impediments appear to be the most significant.65 First, 
appeals against both conviction and sentence require leave to 
appeal from either the trial judge or the appellate court.66 In 
deciding whether to grant leave to appeal, the court assesses 
whether it “feels the need to hear the prosecution on the 
merits.”67 This filtering function has been widely accepted as 
necessary to alleviate the “problem of a flood of appeals” in the 
legal system,68 but it has also been described as “perverse” since 
appeal against convictions for less serious crimes lies of right.69
Second, the loss-of-time rule additionally dissuades appeals. 
Usually, in case of the denial of an appeal, the time spent in 
custody until such a denial counts towards the sentence. 
63. Id. art. 303.
64. Id. art. 297.
65. For other deterrent factors, see KATE MALLESON & RICHARD MOULES, THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM 168–69 (2010) (discussing the narrow grounds on which legal aid is available, all 
of which are affected by the necessity of securing leave to appeal and defendants’ 
knowledge of the “restrictive approach” that the Court of Appeal takes when reviewing 
convictions); J.R. Spencer, Does Our Present Criminal Appeal System Make Sense? 8 
CRIM. L. REV. 677, 685–86 (Aug. 2006) (providing general discussion); Stephanie Roberts 
& Kate Malleson, Streamlining and Clarifying the Appellate Process, 4 CRIM. L. REV. 272, 
280 (2002) (mentioning “the limited scope of legal aid, poor quality legal advice and a 
restrictive approach of the Court of Appeal to its powers”). 
66. CRIMINAL APPEAL ACT 1995, c. 35 § 1 (Eng. & Wales); CRIMINAL APPEAL ACT
1968, c. 19, §§ 10 (acknowledging right to appeal), 31(2)(a) (enumerating powers of single 
judge, including the grant of leave to appeal), 31(3) (indicating that application for leave to 
appeal may be “determined by the Court of Appeal” if a single judge refuses to grant 
leave). 
67. ARCHBOLD CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 1186, § 7-237 (P.J. 
Richardson ed., 2014).
68. ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 11, at 375 (analyzing outcomes for 2008 and 
concluding that of 1,588 initial applicants for leave to appeal “about 10 percent would 
finally succeed in having their convictions quashed”). 
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However, judges may rule that this period is not to be 
subtracted.70 In such circumstances, a loss-of-time ruling 
aggravates the sentence. This mechanism has also met with 
criticism, as it “discourages defendants from pursuing their legal 
rights.”71 Finally, a guilty plea normally precludes a successful 
appeal, unless it can be shown that “a mistaken decision by a 
judge left the accused with no alternative in law but to plead 
guilty.”72
Even though appellate review is usually granted as of right 
in the U.S., appellate courts may refuse to grant appellate review 
in a number of situations. This may be done where the party 
concerned has failed to raise and preserve an error at trial.73 The 
raise-or-waive rule advances, in the main, judicial economy by 
pre-empting unnecessary reversals and appeals.74 The most 
relevant exception to this rule concerns the authority of appellate 
courts to grant relief on the basis of a plain error that was not 
preserved, although the errors amenable to such review differ in 
the various U.S. jurisdictions.75 In addition, appeals will 
generally not be considered where events have rendered the 
claim moot or where the right to appeal has been waived by 
defendants entering a plea deal or those who are fugitives from 
justice.76
Access to appellate review is circumscribed for both the 
defendant and the prosecutor in South Africa in that leave to 
appeal must be acquired.77 Such leave may only be granted 
where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that 
. . . the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success 
or . . . there is some other compelling reason why the 
70. CRIMINAL APPEAL ACT 1968, supra note 66, § 29(1); ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE,
supra note 11, at 373 (citing 1968 Act). 
71. ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 11, at 374. 
72. Id. at 386 (indicating that “[t]he caveat—‘normally’—is aimed at cases where a plea 
was made by mistake or without intention to admit the truth of the charge”). 
73. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1314 (citing both federal and state authorities). 
74. Id. (quoting State v. Applegate, 591 P.2d 371 (Or. 1979)). 
75. Id. at 1315–16 (recognizing that most U.S. jurisdictions acknowledge a plain-error 
exception); cf., e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (2013) (U.S.) (providing that, in federal trial 
courts, “plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not 
brought to the court’s attention”). 
76. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1312–14. 
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appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on 
the matter under consideration.78
Where leave to appeal is refused, “the accused may by petition 
apply to the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal” to renew 
the application.79 The Constitutional Court has confirmed the 
constitutionality of this procedure, because the requirements of 
fairness were satisfied and “[i]t cannot be in the interests of 
justice and fairness to allow unmeritorious and vexatious issues 
of procedure, law or fact to be placed before” the appellate 
tribunal.80
2. Civil Law Jurisdictions Either Guarantee Access to Appellate 
Review without Limitation or Impose Fewer Limitations. 
France belongs to the guaranteed-access category. Thus, its 
system of criminal procedure does not impose any particular 
limitations on the right to seek appellate review. 
In Germany, appellate courts may dispense with a main 
hearing and decide requests for appellate review summarily. In 
practice, appellate proceedings rarely proceed beyond this 
stage.81 Firstly, a complaint may be found to be inadmissible if 
“the provisions on filing an appeal on law or on submission of 
the notices of appeal on law have not been complied with.”82
Secondly, upon a reasoned application by the prosecutor,83 a 
request for appellate review may be dismissed as “manifestly ill-
founded.”84 Such a rejection must be adopted unanimously but 
need not be accompanied by a reasoned opinion.85 Finally, a 
shortened procedure may also operate in favour of the accused, 
78. SUPERIOR COURTS ACT 10 OF 2013 § 17(1)(a) (S. Afr.).
79. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977, supra note 40, § 316(8)(a)(ii).
80. S. v. Rens 1995 (1) ZACC 15 (CC) at 16 para. 25 (S. Afr.); see generally id. at 10–
17 paras. 19–26 (discussing issue more broadly). 
81. GRAF ET AL., supra note 55, at 1540. 
82. STPO, supra note 11, § 349(1).
83. Id. § 349(2) (requiring prosecutor to provide grounds for application).
84. Id. § 349(2). An ill-founded request is one in which it appears to any expert without 
prolonged assessment that the impugned judgment is not erroneous in terms of substantive 
law and that the grounds of appeal do not sustain the complaint. GRAF ET AL., supra note 
55, at 1543.
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because a judgment may be set aside if it is determined that the 
appeal “filed for the defendant’s benefit . . . [is] well-founded.”86
The Argentine Code of Criminal Procedure specifies that 
requests for appellate review must first be filed with the court 
that issued the impugned decision and must exhaustively set out 
each ground of appeal.87 Once the formal requirements have 
been satisfied, a hearing must be held within five days.88
C. Scope of Appellate Review 
1. Common Law Appellate Courts Review Questions of Law De
Novo, but Traditionally Exercise Deference in Relation to 
Questions of Fact. 
In England and Wales, the appellate court does not conduct 
a trial de novo and confines its scrutiny to factual and legal 
errors.89 It “freely reviews decisions for errors of law,”90 which 
mainly concern the formulation, interpretation, or application of 
the law.91 However, “the appellant has to contend with a policy 
of deference towards findings of fact by the judge or jury.”92
Such reticence seems to result mainly from the following 
circumstances: 
i. the trial court directly appreciates the evidence and 
the appellate court has access only to the trial 
record; 
ii. the jury does not provide reasons; 
86. STPO, supra note 11, § 349(4). Although the wording suggests that such a decision 
may be adopted only following an appeal instituted by the accused, this provision has been 
interpreted to cover any type of appeal. GRAF ET AL., supra note 55, at 1548. 
87. CÓD. PROC. PEN., supra note 61, art. 313. 
88. Id.
89. ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 11, at 371, 377–78; Rosemary Pattenden, 
Criminal Appeals: The Purpose of Criminal Appeals, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 488, 491 (M. McConville & G. Wilson eds., 2002). 
90. Rosemary Pattenden, The Standards of Review for Mistake of Fact in the Court of 
Appeal, Criminal Division, 1 CRIM. L. REV. 15, 26 (2009). 
91. Pattenden, supra note 89, at 488. 
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iii. the hesitance to undermine the central role of the 
jury through appellate intervention; 
iv. the emphasis placed on the finality of decisions; and 
v. the consciousness of the criminal justice system’s 
finite resources.93
Even so, the appellate court retains several bases on which to 
intervene in the factual determination of a jury. The appellate 
court has continued the approach of its predecessor in respect of
“inconsistent verdicts,” which involve “multiple charges or 
multiple defendants and apparently contradictory outcomes for 
which the only rational explanation is jury confusion or a wrong 
approach.”94 Moreover, following the simplification of the 
statutory criterion for quashing convictions from “unsafe and 
unsatisfactory” to “unsafe,”95 the “lurking doubt” test was 
introduced for other appeals concerning factual elements of a 
jury verdict.96 This test involves a subjective assessment as to 
whether there remains a lurking doubt in the minds of the judges 
that an injustice was done, although such a determination need 
not be based strictly on the evidence but may be produced by the 
general feel of the case.97 However, hitherto, such appeals have 
been exceptional.98 In addition, when fresh evidence has become 
available post-conviction, the appellate court has further 
possibilities to challenge factual aspects of a jury verdict. The 
appellate court “may, if they think it necessary or expedient in 
the interests of justice . . . receive any evidence which was not 
adduced in the proceedings from which the appeal lies.”99 A 
93. ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 11, at 377–78; see also Pattenden, supra
note 90, at 26–29 (pointing to additional factors, including (i) the autonomy of the fact-
finder; (ii) a margin of appreciation required for the inherently unregulated nature of fact-
finding; and (iii) the fact that, unlike for an error of law, the appellate court probably 
cannot order a retrial for an error of fact). 
94. Pattenden, supra note 90, at 24. 
95. Id. at 25; CRIMINAL APPEAL ACT 1995, supra note 66, § 2(1)–(2) (showing revised 
text). 
96. Pattenden, supra note 90, at 25. 
97. Id. at 26. 
98. Id.; MALLESON & MOULES, supra note 65, at 169 (noting that the Court quashed a 
conviction on “lurking doubt” grounds only six times between 1969 and 1989). 
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question has arisen as to the appropriate standard for assessing 
fresh evidence: Should the appellate court assess whether it 
might have had an impact on the trial jury or should it determine 
its own view of the additional evidence?100
The degree of deference afforded to the trial court is a 
critical element of U.S. appellate procedure. In general, three 
categories may be distinguished.101 Firstly, decisions considered 
to amount to “abuse of discretion” by the trial court are 
reviewed by enquiring whether there is a “definite and firm 
conviction that the . . . court committed a clear error of 
judgment.”102 This standard constitutes the most deferential 
form of appellate review, mainly because the trial judge is 
considered to be in a better position to assess the circumstances 
surrounding such decisions.103 Secondly, factual findings of trial 
judges are subject to “clearly erroneous” review.104 The exact 
ambit of this standard has not been clarified, although it has 
been held that a factual finding is clearly erroneous when “a 
court is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake 
has been committed.”105 In respect of findings of guilt by a jury 
or judge, the appellate court asks “whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”106 The deference afforded to trial 
courts may mainly be explained by their institutional advantages 
vis à vis appellate courts. Whilst the latter must confine their 
examination to the written record, the former, whether 
constituted by a judge or a jury, observe witnesses first-hand and 
are, thus, considered to be better placed to assess their 
100. ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 11, at 380. 
101. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1318 (relying on Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 
552 (1988)). 
102. Id. at 1319; Amy E. Sloan, Appellate Fruit Salad and Other Concepts: A Short 
Course in Appellate Process, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 43, 62–65 (2005) (discussing de novo,
clearly erroneous, and abuse of discretion standards). 
103. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1319. 
104. Id.
105. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 397 (1948). 
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credibility.107 Thirdly, in respect of questions of law, appellate 
courts do not afford any deference to lower courts and provide 
de novo review.108 Strict boundaries between these categories 
are, of course, hard to draw. The delimitations between 
questions of law and fact are especially elusive and, accordingly, 
so-called “mixed questions of law and fact,” which require the 
application of legal principles to historical facts, are also 
reviewed de novo.109
The scope of appellate review has both a factual and legal 
component in South Africa. In relation to an appeal on the facts, 
it has been remarked that the appellate court is “usually loath to 
interfere with the findings of the trial court,” which is especially 
the case if the finding is based on the impressions made by 
witnesses, as the trial court directly appreciates the evidence.110
However, in respect of “inferences, other facts and 
probabilities,” the appellate court is more likely to intervene 
since it is not in a disadvantageous position compared to the trial 
court.111 There is a presumption that “the trial court’s evaluation 
of the evidence as to the facts is correct” and appellate 
interference is, thus, only justified “if it is convinced that the 
evaluation is wrong.”112 A different test governs appeals in 
respect of questions of law. In comparison with a question of 
fact, the appellate court does not ask whether “it would have 
made the same finding but whether the trial court could have 
made such a finding.”113 It is unsurprising that the distinctions 
between questions of law and fact have proved difficult to 
delineate.114 Nevertheless, the meaning afforded to questions of 
law by the Supreme Court of Appeal has been termed “narrow,” 
so as to prevent prosecutorial appeals on questions of fact to be 
presented under the guise of questions of law.115 Finally, 
107. Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal 
Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 435, 444–49 (2004) (discussing institutional competence). 
108. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1319 (citing Pierce).
109. Id. at 1320. 
110. JOUBERT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 409. 
111. Id.
112. Id. at 409–10. 
113. Id. at 410. 
114. Id. at 410–11; see also, e.g., SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 
2.24. 
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considering that the trial court is vested with discretion in 
respect of sentencing, the appellate court intervenes only when 
such discretion has not been exercised judicially.116
2. Appellate Courts in the Civil Law Tradition Also Possess 
Wide-Ranging Powers of Review with Regard to Questions of 
Law, Whereas Their Approach to Questions of Fact is Generally 
Broader.
In 2000, the French Code of Criminal Procedure was 
amended to replace the accused’s right to an appeal on questions 
of law117 with a full-blown right to appeal from such judgments 
to another Cour d’Assises.118 The pre-existing limitation was 
rooted in two considerations.119 First, extensive review of the 
charging decision was considered a safeguard against erroneous 
assessment by the trial court.120 Moreover, considering that the 
trial court is composed of professional judges and laypersons, 
the maxim that the jury does not err further prevented appellate 
review.121 It has been remarked that the review of the charging 
decision was of limited added value and that jury decisions have 
not proved immune to error.122 An appellate court is, therefore, 
mandated to re-examine the case in full123 and proceeds largely 
in accordance with the modalities applicable to first-instance 
proceedings.124
The scope of appellate review is limited in two principal 
ways in Germany. First, a proprio motu examination by the 
appellate court is precluded as the appellate parameters are 
116. JOUBERT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 407. 
117. PRADEL, supra note 50, at 768. 
118. C. PR. PÉN, supra note 49, arts. 380-1, 380-2.
119. PRADEL, supra note 50, at 768. 
120. C. PR. PÉN, supra note 49, arts. 79 (addressing preliminary investigation), 181 
(addressing indictment), 191 (describing investigating chamber of appeals court), 214 
(addressing indictment).
121. C. PR. PÉN, supra note 49, arts. 240, 254. 
122. PRADEL, supra note 50, at 768. 
123. C. PR. PÉN, supra note 49, art. 380-1; Richard S. Frase, France, in CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE—A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 13, at 236 (explaining that “potentially a 
trial de novo on all issues of fact, law or sentencing raised by the appeal” is possible at this 
stage).
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defined by the notice of appeal.125 Second, appellate review is 
confined to legal issues.126 In this regard, the German Code of 
Criminal Procedure sets forth that 
[o]nly the notices of appeal on law and, insofar as the 
appeal on law is based on defects in the proceedings, only 
the facts specified when the notices of appeal on law were 
submitted, shall be subject to review by the court hearing 
the appeal.127
The Code also provides that “[f]ailure to apply a legal norm or 
erroneous application of a legal norm” is a “violation of the 
law.”128 However, whether a judgment is based on a violation of 
law has been liberally construed, considering that the possibility 
thereof has been considered sufficient to overturn a judgment.129
Even though the factual basis established at first instance may 
not be directly reviewed,130 it has been remarked that appellate 
courts increasingly “second-guess trial courts’ fact finding.”131
For instance, challenges to the substantive correctness of 
judgments have been granted on the basis of violations of the 
procedural obligation to “extend the taking of evidence to all 
facts and means of proof relevant to the decision”132 and the 
obligation to ensure the completeness and the logical 
consistency of the evidentiary evaluation by disregarding 
obvious, alternative interpretations of the evidence.133
In Argentina, the 1993 amendments to the National Code of 
Criminal Procedure have replaced de novo review with review 
of questions of law.134 Even so, the Supreme Court has 
expanded the scope of appellate review. The highest Argentine 
court has noted that, whilst a narrow interpretation of appellate 
125. GRAF ET AL., supra note 55, at 1561. 
126. STPO, supra note 11, § 333.
127. Id. § 352(1).
128. Id. § 337(2).
129. Thomas Weigend, Germany, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—A WORLDWIDE STUDY,
supra note 13, at 269; GRAF ET AL., supra note 55, at 1432.
130. STPO, supra note 11, § 337(1) (providing that “[a]n appeal on law may be filed 
only on the ground that the judgment was based upon a violation of the law”).
131. Weigend, supra note 129, at 271.
132. STPO, supra note 11, § 244(2).
133. Weigend, supra note 129, at 271; see also GRAF ET AL. supra note 55, at 1386, 
1397, 1412. 
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review as limited to questions of law is “solely the product of 
. . . legislative tradition and history,” the text “lends itself to both 
[a] narrow and [a] broad or liberal interpretation.”135 In addition, 
it has held that Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights and Article 14(5) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights “should be interpreted as requiring 
review of any issue not exclusively reserved for those judges on 
the bench for the oral proceedings,” which is a limitation that 
arises out of “the principle of publicity” and the fact that 
“cassation judges do not have firsthand knowledge of the oral 
proceedings.”136 In light of the impossibility to differentiate 
between questions of law and fact in practice, it has concluded 
that appellate review 
should be understood as enabling a full review of the 
judgment, one that is as extensive as possible, requiring 
that cassation judges put out the maximum review effort, 
according to the possibilities and records of each case and 
without making too much of those issues that are reserved 
for the judges who were present for the oral proceedings.137
The current Argentine National Code of Criminal Procedure 
draws a distinction between the scope of appellate review 
applicable to first instance judgments imposing a conviction and 
those pronouncing an acquittal. The grounds of appeal for 
decisions falling in the former category are broadly formulated 
and include, besides legal errors, the omission to consider 
decisive evidence or the consideration of non-existent evidence 
and the erroneous assessment of the evidence and facts 
supporting a conviction and sentence.138 The grounds of appeal 
pertaining to the latter category have been drafted more 
restrictively and concern, in the main, the erroneous application 
of the law and the lack of reasoning or a judgment that is 
contradictory, unreasonable, or arbitrary.139
135. Mendoza v. Argentina, Case 12.561, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 172/10, 
¶ 228, n.156 (2010), available at http://www.worldcourts.com/iacmhr/eng/decisions/2010 
.11.02_Mendoza_v_Argentina.pdf. 
136. Id. ¶ 226, n. 155. 
137. Id.
138. CÓD. PROC. PEN., supra note 61, art. 311. 





      05/06/2019   10:22:20
41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 29 Side A      05/06/2019   10:22:20
DJUKICRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)  4/30/2019 7:53 PM 
THE RIGHT TO APPEAL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 207
D. Additional Evidence 
1. Common Law Appellate Systems Either Deny the Admission 
of Additional Evidence or Admit It Only in Exceptional 
Circumstances.
In England and Wales, the appellate court is empowered to 
order the production of “any document, exhibit or other thing 
connected with the proceedings,” the attendance of any witness 
for examination, and investigations into any matter.140 Yet the 
court has proved to be reluctant to do so in practice.141
The court of appeal in South Africa decides on the basis of 
the record of the proceedings before the court of first instance,142
but the appellate record may be expanded. An application for 
leave to appeal to the appellate court “may be accompanied by 
an application to adduce further evidence” which “must be” 
supported by an affidavit stating that 
(i) further evidence which would presumably be 
accepted as true, is available; 
(ii) if accepted the evidence could reasonably lead to a 
different verdict or sentence; and 
(iii) there is a reasonably acceptable explanation for 
the failure to produce the evidence before the close of 
the trial.143
In addition, where further evidence comes to light after leave to 
appeal has been granted, the appellate court has the power to 
receive it.144 It may also remit the case “for further hearing, with 
such instructions as regards the taking of further evidence or 
otherwise” as it deems necessary.145 Additional evidence is 
admitted only exceptionally, although the appellate court may 
exercise a degree of flexibility in this regard, provided that it is 
140. CRIMINAL APPEAL ACT 1968, supra note 66, §§ 23(1)(a)–(b), 23A; CRIMINAL 
APPEAL ACT 1995, supra note 66, § 5 (showing change in statutory text).
141. Stephanie Roberts, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice and Factual 
Innocence: Remedying Wrongful Convictions in the Court of Appeal, 1 JUSTICE J. 86, 92 
(2004) (reporting fewer “fresh evidence” appeals in 2004 than in 2002). 
142. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977, supra note 40, § 316(7)(a).
143. Id. § 316(5)(a)–(b).
144. SUPERIOR COURTS ACT 10 OF 2013, supra note 78, § 19(b); JOUBERT HANDBOOK,
supra note 2, at 446–47.  
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satisfied that, upon admission of the evidence, there is a 
reasonable probability that the person concerned would not be 
convicted in a further hearing.146 The U.S. appellate system does 
not permit additional evidence to be presented on appeal.147
2. Certain Civil Law Jurisdictions Allow the Presentation of 
Additional Evidence on Appeal, with or without Restrictions. 
In line with its de novo approach to appellate review,148 the 
French appellate system permits the calling of additional 
evidence both by the appellate court proprio motu and the 
parties.149 In Argentina, appellate judges may receive evidence 
proposed for admission by the appellant if they deem it to be 
necessary and useful.150 However, in Germany, appellate 
hearings do not accommodate the presentation of evidence.151
E. Appellate Decisionmaking Powers 
1. Appellate Courts in Common Law Systems Tend to Emphasise 
Remittal over Instantaneous Appellate Resolution. 
In England and Wales, the appellate court disposes of broad 
statutory prerogatives. In addition to allowing or dismissing an 
appeal, it may substitute a conviction for an alternative offence, 
“where the appellant has been convicted of an offence and the 
jury could on the indictment have found him guilty of some 
other offence.”152 The court may further order a retrial if the 
interests of justice so require.153
146. JOUBERT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 436. 
147. Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQUETTE 
L. REV. 591, 605 (2009) (pointing out that “in almost every jurisdiction in the United 
States, there is no mechanism that ensures litigants a right to introduce new evidence of 
innocence during the direct appeal process,” and pointing out that “[a]ppellate courts do 
not hear new evidence”). 
148. See supra Section II.C. 
149. C. PR. PÉN., supra note 49, art. 310; PRADEL, supra note 50, at 783. 
150. CÓD. PROC. PEN., supra note 61, art. 314. 
151. GRAF ET AL., supra note 55, at 1559. 
152. CRIMINAL APPEAL ACT 1968, supra note 66, § 3. 
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U.S. appellate courts may reverse a first-instance judgment, 
which entails nullification and prevents retrial.154 Usually, 
however, the appellate court reverses the judgment and remands 
the case for retrial.155
The appellate court in South Africa may adopt a number of 
decisions. Firstly, with regard to “an appeal against a conviction 
or of any question of law reserved,” it may 
(a) allow the appeal if it thinks that the judgment of the trial 
court should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision 
of any question of law or that on any ground there was a 
failure of justice; or 
(b) give such judgment as ought to have been given at the 
trial or impose such punishment as ought to have been 
imposed at the trial; or 
(c) make such other order as justice may require.156
Thus, for instance, where a reserved question of law is answered 
in favour of the State, an acquittal may be substituted with a 
conviction and a sentence may be imposed.157 Secondly, in 
relation to sentencing appeals, the appellate court “may confirm 
the sentence or may delete or amend the sentence and impose 
such punishment as ought to have been imposed at the trial.”158
Although it could not do so prior to 1963, the appellate court 
now possesses “the power to impose a punishment more severe 
154. Craig M. Bradley, United States, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—A WORLDWIDE 
STUDY, supra note 13, at 547 (listing various grounds on which convictions may be 
reversed, but also noting that “[o]nly if the appellate court reverses the conviction for 
insufficient evidence is the defendant likely to be acquitted by the appellate court,” as 
principles of double jeopardy would seem to compel that outcome). 
155. Id.; RONALD WALDRON ET AL., THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM—AN
INTRODUCTION 108–09 (2010). 
156. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977, supra note 40, § 322(1). This section 
includes a proviso, according to which, 
notwithstanding that the court of appeal is of opinion that any point raised might 
be decided in favour of the accused, no conviction or sentence shall be set aside 
or altered by reason of any irregularity or defect in the record or proceedings, 
unless it appears to the court of appeal that a failure of justice has in fact resulted 
from such irregularity or defect. 
Id.; see also SUPERIOR COURTS ACT 10 OF 2013, supra note 78, § 19 (laying down similar 
prerogatives). For a discussion of the proviso in section 322, see JOUBERT HANDBOOK,
supra note 2, at 447–49. 
157. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 2.26.
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than that imposed by the court below.”159 The appellate court 
may even increase the sentence when no appeal against sentence 
is taken, as long as it provides notice to the appellant that it 
contemplates an aggravation.160 Finally, where it sets aside a 
conviction and sentence on the ground that “the court . . . was 
not competent” to convict the accused, that “the indictment . . . 
was invalid or defective,” or that “there has been any other 
technical irregularity or defect in the procedure,” the appellate 
court is empowered to institute de novo proceedings.161
Furthermore, de novo proceedings may also be ordered if a 
prosecutorial appeal against an acquittal is granted.162
2. Civil Law Jurisdictions More Readily Allow Appellate Courts 
to Instantaneously Resolve Matters Before Them. 
The French appellate process proceeds largely in 
accordance with the modalities applicable to first-instance 
proceedings and, ultimately, the appellate court adopts a new 
decision.163 It may, in addition, requalify the facts established at 
first instance in legal terms, provided that no additional facts are 
encompassed by the requalification.164 Even so, several 
constraints on the powers of an appellate court may be 
identified. It may not broaden the matter it is seized of by, for 
instance, convicting the appellant of offences not considered by 
the court of first instance.165 Moreover, where the appellant 
curtails his or her appeal to particular elements of the first-
instance decision, the appellate assessment may not exceed these 
limitations.166 Finally, appellate aggravation is disallowed in 
certain circumstances.167 Most importantly, where an appeal is 
only instituted by the accused, no decision to his or her 
detriment may be adopted.168
159. Id. § 322(6); JOUBERT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 446. 
160. JOUBERT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 446. 
161. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977, supra note 40, § 324.
162. Id. §§ 322(4), 324.
163. C. PR. PÉN., supra note 49, art. 380-1. 
164. PRADEL, supra note 50, at 783. 
165. Id. at 783. 
166. Id. at 784. 
167. Id. at 784–85. 
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In Germany, in the event that a judgment is quashed on 
appeal, it must be remitted to a lower court in most situations.169
However, in certain circumstances, the appellate court may 
dispose of the matter itself. This mainly occurs 
[w]here the judgment is quashed solely because of a 
violation of the law occurring on its application to the 
findings on which the judgment was based, . . . [and] 
without further discussion of the facts, the judgment is to 
take the form of an acquittal or termination of proceedings 
or imposition of a mandatory penalty, or if, in accordance 
with the public prosecution office’s application, the court 
hearing the appeal on law deems the statutory minimum 
penalty or dispensing with punishment to be reasonable.170
These powers may be employed to the accused’s detriment as 
well,171 as long as the appellate court verifies whether the altered 
basis for conviction was included in the accusation, the accused 
was informed thereof, and a different and more fruitful defence 
could have been presented.172 However, where an appeal is filed 
only by the accused, or if the prosecution files an appeal in 
favour of the accused, the judgment may not be amended to his 
or her detriment.173
In Argentina, the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly 
requires that, in general, the judges of the appellate court 
adjudicate cases without remittal except if it is unavoidable.174 It 
specifically instructs the appellate court not to resort to remittal 
if the correct application of the law results in the acquittal of the 
accused or the termination of the proceedings, or if it is evident 
that it is not necessary to conduct a new trial in order to adopt a 
decision.175 A further remedy is open to the accused should the 
decision of the appellate court be adverse to him or her 
following an appeal instituted by the prosecutor.176 In case of a 
remittal, a sentence higher than the one imposed in the original 
trial is disallowed if the remittal is ordered as a result of an 
169. STPO, supra note 11, § 354(2)–(3).
170. Id. § 354(1); see also id. § 354(1a)–(1b).
171. GRAF ET AL., supra note 55, at 1586–87. 
172. STPO, supra note 11, § 265.
173. Id. §§ 331, 358(2).
174. CÓD. PROC. PEN., supra note 61, art. 317.
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appeal lodged by the accused or the prosecutor on his or her 
behalf.177 In addition, if the retrial produces a second acquittal, it 
is no longer amenable to appellate review.178
F. Functions of Appellate Review 
The two primary functions assigned to appellate review 
extend, in principle, to common law and civil law systems 
alike.179 Such review concerns, first, “the pursuit of justice in the 
individual case.”180 Adjudication of guilt or innocence 
constitutes an extremely intrusive measure and may entail severe 
consequences both for the defendant and for society more 
broadly. It is, therefore, paramount that the possibility of error is 
reduced to the extent possible. Therefore, at its core, appellate 
review is a “quality-control” mechanism.181 The second goal of 
appellate review is two-fold: “consistency of verdicts, meaning 
that similar cases receive similar treatment, and orderly 
development of law, meaning that novel questions of law 
receive uniform answers from a single authoritative body.”182
This function predominantly generates “systemic” effects for the 
legal system as a whole.183
While common law systems prioritise the systemic function 
of appellate review over its quality-control function, civil law 
systems emphasise the latter function. This distinction may be 
deduced from the differing treatment of questions of law and 
fact in these systems. Appellate review of questions of law 
primarily engages the systemic function of appellate review, 
177. Id. art. 317. 
178. Id. 
179. The limitations of the research on which this article is based prevent a more wide-
ranging discussion of the rationales of appellate review, but good general discussions are 
available elsewhere. See, e.g., ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 11, at 370–401; 
Marshall, supra note 10, at 3–4; Martin Shapiro, Appeal, 14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 629 (1980). 
180.  Mark C. Fleming, Appellate Review in the International Criminal Tribunals, 37 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 111, 114 (2002).
181. MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 49 (1986). 
182. Fleming, supra note 180, at 114; see also Pattenden, supra note 89, at 487; 
Marshall, supra note 10, at 3–4; ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 11, at 370;
JOUBERT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 402.
183. However, this goal also produces quality-control effects, seeing that it ensures that 
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because the ramifications of such questions are more 
generalizable to other situations. Questions of fact, on the other 
hand, are predominantly concerned with the quality-control 
function of appellate review, as their effects remain principally 
confined to the specific situations under consideration. The 
appellate systems of common law and civil law jurisdictions 
espouse, as mentioned, diverging approaches in this regard. 
Whereas appellate review of questions of fact in common law 
systems is more restrained, questions of law are invariably 
reviewed de novo at second instance.184 On the other hand, the 
appellate systems of civil law countries, even those that 
nominally restrict appellate review to questions of law, provide 
more room for appellate review of matters of fact.185 In such 
constructions, the systemic function of appellate review is 
mainly engaged after the quality-control function during 
additional levels of appellate review. 
III. THE DISSIMILARITIES EXPLAINED
Beyond the fact that common law systems have come to 
approximate civil law systems in respect of the availability of 
appellate control at second instance and that timid signs of 
convergence in respect of other facets of appellate review may 
be distinguishable, these systems generally pursue diverging 
approaches regarding prosecutorial rights of appeal, access to 
appellate review, additional evidence, the scope of appellate 
review, appellate courts’ powers, and the functions of appellate 
review. Some of these differences have been explained by 
particular aspects of these systems. 
For instance, the differences in appellate rights afforded to 
prosecutorial authorities and the accused have been linked to the 
extent of lay participation permitted in criminal justice.186 In 
more specific terms, lay participation has been assigned a 
pivotal role in common law systems and an appeal by the 
prosecution on the basis of alleged errors of fact would allow a 
peers’ assessment of not guilty to be second-guessed by 
184. See supra § II.C. 
185. Id.
186. DAMAŠKA, supra note 181, at 18–19, 24–25 (discussing differences in systems 
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detached bureaucrats.187 In addition, the possibility of juries 
acquitting against the dictates of the law on the basis of, for 
instance, moral or ethical considerations (so-called “jury equity” 
or “jury nullification”) would also be thwarted by prosecutorial 
appeals.188 The enhanced emphasis on lay participation in 
common law systems would, thus, warrant a commensurate 
reduction in the appellate rights of prosecutorial authorities, 
while the absence or reduced degree of lay participation in civil 
law jurisdictions is considered conducive to broad rights of 
appeal held by prosecutors. 
It has, furthermore, been advanced that the differing scope 
of appellate proceedings in common law and civil law systems 
result from the inferior fact-finding position of the former vis à 
vis the latter. In the common law setting, juries do not, in 
general, give reasons for their decisions189 and, in respect of a 
trial by judge alone, the need for reasoning may be limited.190
Civil law judges, on the other hand, generally provide a 
reasoned opinion at first instance.191 Therefore, lacking access to 
the specific reasons underlying a verdict of guilt or innocence, 
common law appellate courts’ review would be necessarily more 
restrained than the review performed by civil law appellate 
courts. More importantly, the disparate approaches are 
considered logical corollaries of the types of appellate 
proceedings in these systems. As discussed, common law 
appellate courts have developed a deferential attitude concerning 
trial courts’ findings of fact, as they are generally constrained to 
187. George P. Fletcher, The Influence of the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions 
on International Criminal Law in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 104, 108 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009) (referring to the prohibition of 
appeal by the prosecution in U.S. courts as “express[ing] the veto power that the jury enjoy 
over the prosecutorial power of the state”).
188. Pattenden, supra note 24, at 985. 
189. ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 11, at 377; Thomas Weigend, Is the 
Criminal Process about Truth? A German Perspective, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 157, 
166 (2003) (recognizing that “the jury is not required to give reasons for its verdict and 
thus is not answerable to anyone regarding the rationality of its decision”). 
190. Michael Bohlander, Prosecution Appeals against Acquittals in Bench Trials—The 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Government’s Fear of the Dark, 69 J. CRIM. L. 326, 328 
(2005) (pointing out that “conceptually it would be strange to ask a judge to treat him- or 
herself as a jury and ruminate whether he or she could reasonably convict” (footnote 
omitted)).
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a review of the record and rarely admit additional evidence or 
rehear first-instance evidence.192 Conversely, in the civil law 
context, a deferential stance is, in general, less compatible with 
appellate proceedings involving either a complete de novo trial 
or a more flexible approach to first-instance evidence and 
additional evidence.193 Accordingly, civil law judges are said to 
be in a better position to exercise far-reaching appellate control 
than common law judges, considering that they face fewer fact-
finding constraints. 
However, these lines of argument do not explain the 
dissimilarities in their entirety. Three arguments provide a more 
comprehensive explanation, namely the relationship between the 
types of decisionmaking in the legal process, the extent of 
judicial truth-seeking, and the relationship between the sources 
of law and appellate review. 
A. Decisionmaking 
In relation to “organizing procedural authority,”194 two 
ideals have been proposed. The first type is a “classical 
bureaucracy” (“the hierarchical ideal”),195 which civil law 
systems find “much more congenial.”196 The other type is 
“defined by a body of nonprofessional decision makers, 
organized into a single level of authority which makes decisions 
by applying undifferentiated community standards” (“the 
coordinate ideal”),197 which is more readily associated with 
common law systems.198
One of the implications is that common law and civil law 
systems operate a dissimilar process of decisionmaking. It has 
been remarked, for instance, that, in the coordinate variation of 
the administration of justice encountered in common law 
systems, “[a]n essentially homogeneous single level of authority 
spawns proceedings that center around the original . . . 
192. See supra §§ II.C and II.D. 
193. Id.
194. DAMAŠKA, supra note 181, at 16. 
195. Id. at 17.
196. Id. at 18.
197. Id. at 17.





      05/06/2019   10:22:20
41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 33 Side B      05/06/2019   10:22:20
DJUKICRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)  4/30/2019 7:53 PM 
216 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
adjudicator.”199 In other words, such a system “concentrates on 
the trial as the relevant locus for fact-finding.”200 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has revealingly held that a first-instance trial 
should be “the ‘main event’ . . . rather than a ‘tryout on the 
road.’”201 On the contrary, the hierarchical model of civil law 
systems does not focus to the same extent on the trial stage in 
relation to decisionmaking. It allows “participants at several 
stages” to shape the fact-finding process, including on the 
appellate level.202
Therefore, the coordinate model employs “concentrated” 
decisionmaking, which is limited to a large extent to a single 
stage of the legal process, and the hierarchical model is 
characterised by “pluralistic” decisionmaking, which persists 
throughout sequential stages of a trial. These different types of 
decisionmaking entail obvious ramifications for the operation of 
the principle of finality in the different systems. Although it may 
be considered for both systems that “[t]here is value to the 
parties, and to society as a whole, in accepting that a contested 
issue has been resolved,”203 the principle of finality manifests 
itself differently in these contexts. In common law systems, 
concentrated decisionmaking logically implies that the 
“original” adjudicator is also the “presumptively final” one,204
which suggests that first-instance decisions are awarded a high 
degree of finality. Pluralistic decisionmaking in civil law 
systems entails that the finality of a first-instance judgment is 
postponed until all appellate remedies have been exhausted,205
thus entailing a decreased degree of finality. 
This distinction accounts, in part, for the diverging 
conceptions of appellate proceedings in common law and civil 
law systems. Proceedings employing “concentrated” 
decisionmaking and increased first-instance finality necessarily 
199. Id. at 57.
200. Weigend, supra note 189, at 160.
201. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (considering state trial in federal 
habeas context).
202. Fletcher, supra note 187, at 109 (contrasting this approach with that of the 
common law, which “focuses not on pre-trial and post-trial confirmation but exclusively on 
the decisions reached at trial”). 
203. ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 11, at 399.
204. DAMAŠKA, supra note 181, at 57.
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seek to insulate first-instance adjudication, to a high degree, 
from extraneous adjustment. Therefore, access to appellate 
review is hampered to ensure that only those claims that have a 
reasonable chance of success are admitted, appellate 
proceedings are of a comparatively limited nature (which entails 
a constrained approach to additional evidence and a reduced 
scope of appellate review), and appellate courts shy away from 
instantaneous decisionmaking. On the other hand, in systems 
operating under a “pluralistic” decisionmaking process and 
reduced first-instance finality, appellate review is conceived of 
broadly and constitutes an important factor in the overall factual 
and legal assessment. Thus, lowered obstacles to appellate 
access ensure that appellate courts routinely review first-
instance decisions and extensive appellate structures supplement 
the initial decisionmaking process, which explains the 
predilection for the broadened approach to additional evidence, 
a wide scope of appellate review, and an aversion from remittal. 
B. Truth-Seeking 
Common law systems and civil law systems are 
theoretically distinguished by the nature of their legal 
proceedings. Common law proceedings have been labelled 
“adversarial.”206 In general, such proceedings are party driven. 
The procedural aim of this model “is to settle the conflict 
stemming from the allegation of commission of crime” and the 
proceedings amount to “a contest.”207 In contradistinction, civil 
law proceedings are considered to be “non-adversarial.” This 
model generally features judicial proceedings controlled by non-
partisan officials. The procedural aim of such proceedings is to 
establish, by means of “an official and thorough inquiry,” 
whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal 
sanctions are justified.208 The “court-controlled pursuit of facts” 
involves a “‘unilateral’” and “detached” process that dispenses 
206. DAMAŠKA, supra note 81, at 562 (introducing “adversary” and non-adversary” 
models). 
207. Id. at 563.
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with the need for “‘[p]arties’ in the sense of independent 
actors.”209
Whereas the establishment of the truth seems (one of) the 
primary aim(s) of any system of criminal procedure, it has been 
contended that the civil law “system of procedure is more 
committed to the search for truth”210 than that of the common 
law system. Thus, in respect of the latter, the primary concern is 
to ensure that “parties abide by the rules regulating their 
‘battle’” and that “[t]he judgment itself is not so much in the 
nature of a pronouncement on the true facts of the case; it is, 
rather, a decision between the parties.”211 A federal judge in the 
U.S. has remarked, along these lines, that the “adversary system 
rates truth too low among the values that institutions of justice 
are meant to serve”212 and a state judge in the U.S. has opined 
that “storm clouds linger over . . . the capacity of the adversarial 
process to promote effectively the search for truth.”213 Where 
proceedings are structured like an official enquiry, as in civil 
law systems, “the concern for ascertaining the facts of the case is 
much more central.”214
This characterisation bears significantly on the differing 
conceptions of appellate review in common law and civil law 
systems. For instance, in a general criticism of the importance of 
appeals in the U.S. system, a U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
illustratively derided “the legal community’s ‘obsessive concern 
that the result reached in a particular case be the right one.’”215
Indeed, the restrained access to appellate review and the more 
restrained nature of appellate proceedings in common law 
systems clearly reflect the diminished importance attached to the 
209. Id.
210. Id. at 581; see also id. at 513–50 (discussing barriers to conviction).
211. Id. at 581–82.
212. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1032 (1975). 
213. Thomas L. Steffen, Truth as Second Fiddle: Reevaluating the Place of Truth in the 
Adversarial Trial Ensemble, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 799, 800. 
214. DAMAŠKA, supra note 81, at 582 (footnote omitted).
215. Arkin, supra note 3, at 508 (referring to Chief Justice Rehnquist). It has similarly 
been remarked that “it ultimately may be that accuracy and protecting against convicting 
the innocent are not really the paramount objectives of the [U.S.] appellate system,” rather 
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material truth.216 In addition, the more limited rights of appeal 
provided to prosecutorial authorities regarding acquittals on 
questions of fact in common law systems may also be explained 
on this basis. At least to a certain degree, common law 
prosecutors are deprived of the opportunity to redress wrongful 
acquittals, which prevents the establishment of the material truth 
in such situations. On the other hand, the reduced obstacles to 
appellate review and the more expansive nature of appellate 
review disclose a heightened dedication to the promotion of 
judicial accuracy in civil law systems. Similarly, the fact that the 
rights of appeal of the prosecution and the defendant have been 
equated in such systems further reflects the need to correctly 
appraise relevant facts. Unlike in most common law systems, 
civil law prosecutors may appeal for the benefit of the accused, 
which further adds to this commitment. 
C. Sources of Law 
Civil law and common law are classically distinguished on 
the basis of the sources of law emphasised in each.217 Sources in 
the common law are mainly based on judge-made law. “During 
the formative period of English legal history,” in which the 
common law family originated, “there was no strong central 
legislative body, but . . . the powerful king’s courts” developed 
the law.218 A decision of a court “was not only the law for those 
parties, but had to be followed in future cases of the same sort, 
thereby becoming a part of the general or common law.”219 The 
stability and continuity of this system were dependent on “the 
doctrine of ‘precedent,’” which required that “[o]nce a point had 
been decided, the same result had to be reached for the same 
216. See generally, e.g., Elisabetta Grande, Dances of Criminal Justice: Thoughts on 
Systemic Differences and the Search for the Truth in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 
IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR 
MIRJAN DAMAŠKA 145, 159–60 (John D. Jackson et al. eds., 2008) (discussing Herrera v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)). 
217. PRADEL, supra note 8, at 631–32; see also Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the 
Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419, 423 (1967) 
(acknowledging reliance on legislation in civil law systems and on case law in common 
law systems). 






      05/06/2019   10:22:20
41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 35 Side B      05/06/2019   10:22:20
DJUKICRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)  4/30/2019 7:53 PM 
220 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
problem” when courts confronted it later.220 Conversely, in the 
civil law, “the main source or basis of the law is legislation, and 
large areas are codified in a systematic manner.”221 Such codes 
are not lists “of special rules for particular situations,” but “a 
body of general principles.”222
Considering that common law systems emphasise judicial 
precedent, questions of law assume a central role in appellate 
proceedings. As to “consistency” in the formulation and 
application of the law, inferior courts may produce contradictory 
and erroneous interpretations of the law. In order to preserve the 
centrality of precedent, common law appellate courts must, thus, 
act as a harmonising factor. With regard to the “development” of 
the law, common law judges retain primary responsibility for the 
discovery of the law. Because they are located in the upper 
echelons of judicial hierarchy, common law appellate judges, 
thus, necessarily have far-reaching developmental 
responsibilities. Conversely, the central role of codified law in 
civil law systems moderates the adherence to precedent. 
Codified law is more unyielding than a system relying on 
interpretations by a host of courts, although it remains 
susceptible to conflicting readings, and emerges mainly from 
political-legislative processes. Accordingly, the appellate judges 
in such systems assume a far more limited role in respect of the 
homogenisation and discovery of the law. 
The different sources of law, therefore, engender differing 
dynamics in appellate proceedings. The predominance of 
unwritten rules stresses the creation of legal certainty and the 
discovery of the law on appeal, which, in turn, leads to a 
prioritisation of questions of law and the systemic function of 
appellate review in common law systems. On the other hand, the 
application of more stable codified rules of law creates more 
latitude for factual assessments on appeal and the quality-control 
function of appellate review in civil law jurisdictions. 
220. Id. at 425. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
In relation to appellate review, civil law and common law 
systems have converged in that the latter have generally 
eliminated the historical absence of the right to appeal. 
However, at least in relation to the most severe crimes under 
national law, these systems put the right to appeal into effect in 
different ways on account of dissimilar decisionmaking 
processes, approaches to legal truth-seeking, and emphases 
placed on the sources of law. 
A number of factors could potentially lead to further 
confluence between these systems in the future. For instance, 
international human rights law could establish minimum 
standards for appellate proceedings in common law and civil 
law systems alike. The different rights to appeal in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,223
American Convention on Human Rights,224 and Protocol 7 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights225 constitute a relatively 
late addition to the corpus of fair-trial standards.226 Further 
development of these provisions by the human rights monitoring 
bodies in the future may, therefore, exert harmonising effects.227
In addition, legal reforms could also ensure more cohesion. 
Common law systems have broadened or proposed to broaden 
prosecutorial rights of appeal, while certain civil law systems 
have narrowed the scope of appellate review. Technological 
223. UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
art. 14(5), 19 Dec. 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 14668 (providing that “[e]veryone convicted of a 
crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher 
tribunal according to law”) [hereinafter ICCPR].
224. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS: PACT OF SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA, art. 8(2)(h), 22 Nov. 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 17955 
(providing that “[e]very person accused of a criminal offense has . . . [t]he right to appeal 
the judgment to a higher court”).
225. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Protocol 7, 
art. 2(1), 22 Nov. 1984, 1525 U.N.T.S. 2889 (providing that “[e]veryone convicted of a 
criminal offence by a tribunal shall have the right to have his conviction or sentence 
reviewed by a higher tribunal”) [hereinafter ECHR—Protocol 7].
226. DAVID WEISSBRODT, THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 43–69 (2001). 
227. JAKOB TH. MÖLLER & ALFRED DE ZAYAS, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMITTEE CASE LAW 1977–2008: A HANDBOOK 308–09 (2009) (discussing undecided 
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developments may additionally temper some of the differences. 
For instance, the use of video technology could create the 
preconditions for appellate courts in common law systems to 
broaden their scope of appellate review. In relation to the U.S., it 
has been argued that “[v]ideo technology refutes the rhetoric of 
necessity that has long been invoked to defend traditional 
standards of appellate court deference to trial court 
decisionmaking.”228 Accordingly, “[a]ppellate courts . . . now 
can have access via video to the same ‘data’ that presumably 
inform the discretionary decisions of trial judges.”229
However, countervailing indications may be discerned as 
well. The different human rights instruments permit national 
authorities a significant degree of discretion in determining how 
to give effect to the right to appeal.230 Thus, besides a commonly 
applicable core, many of the divergences between common law 
and civil law appellate systems may persist within such a 
discretionary margin. In addition, it remains to be seen whether 
legal reforms and technological developments are able to 
overcome ingrained legal concepts. Most importantly, any 
alterations to the appellate process inspired by another legal 
tradition must be carefully configured. Particular legal concepts 
exist within a specific context and an uncontrolled 
transplantation without accompanying checks and balances may 
result in a fair-trial deficit. 
228. Robert C. Owen & Melissa Mather, Thawing Out the “Cold Record”: Some 
Thoughts on How Videotaped Records May Affect Traditional Standards of Deference on 
Direct and Collateral Review, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 411, 412 (2000). 
229. Id.
230. Both the ICCPR and Protocol 7 to the ECHR indicate that the right to appeal shall 
be exercised in accordance with national law. ICCPR, supra note 223, art. 14(5); ECHR—
Protocol 7, supra note 225, art. 2. The same applies to the prohibitions against double 
jeopardy that appear in both. ICCPR, supra note 223, art. 14(7); ECHR—Protocol 7, supra
note 225, art. 4(1).  
